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Many micro-states have an economic model that attracts global 
corporations and international financial activities, because plugging into the 
global economy is important for states that have small domestic economies. To 
attract businesses, micro-states often offer low business and corporation taxes 
or lax regulatory regimes to compete in the fiercely competitive global market. 
Therefore, micro-states are criticised as offering havens, engaging in harmful 
tax competition and leading a race to the bottom. Although international 
efforts—such as those led by the Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and 
Development (“OECD”) and Financial Action Task Force (“FATF”)—have 
secured some co-operation from such micro-states, the micro-states’ position 
remains an uneasy one in the international legal order, as they engage in 
regulatory competition with onshore jurisdictions and with each other. 
Following the global financial crisis from 2007 to 2009, a slew of aggressive 
extra-territorial legislation in the area of taxation and finance has been 
introduced by a number of powerful jurisdictions to bring a new onslaught onto 
the micro-states’ economic models. This article argues that the US, EU and UK 
are leading such a move from the traditional multilateral approaches to 
governing micro-states’ role in regulatory competition to unilateral approaches 
that are more overtly antagonistic to micro-states’ economic models in offshore 
tax and finance. This article examines why such a move has occurred, and the 
confluence of driving factors for such a move. This article also examines the 
key unilateral measures, i.e. the rise of automatic information reporting 
regimes such as the US FATCA, the more modest EU equivalent, the UK’s 
new corporate reporting and tax enforcement regimes, and the EU’s reforms in 
financial regulation. We also see a trend in these unilateral strategies giving 
rise to more coordinated multilateral adoption of such strategies. 
Based on a consultancy project the author led in 2015, we have gained 
first-hand insights into policy-making in a micro-state which is facing the 
challenges described above. Micro-states offering the old models of tax and 
financial services are at the cusp of change. However, they have little choice 
but to continue to try and thrive in global economic competition. We provide 
some reflections on micro-states’ continuing role in regulatory competition in 
the changing international legal order. 
 
I. THE ECONOMIC MODEL OF MICRO-STATES 
Many micro-states are run on an economic model that encourages the 
migration of legal structures (whether or not associated with real productive 
activity) and financial flows in the competitive global economic landscape. 
Business vehicles, corporate structures and financial flows are attracted to 
micro-states as they are usually tax havens and/or offshore financial centres 
that protect bank secrecy and offer legal and regulatory regimes that are 
friendly for financial transactions. 1 Often, tax havens and offshore financial 
                                                          
1. *Reader in Laws, University College London. This article is a part of a consultancy 
project UCL undertook for a micro-state jurisdiction in May-November 2015. The author thanks 
colleagues Anna Donovan and Martin Petrin for reading an earlier draft and providing comments, 
all errors are mine. 
Offshore financial centres (“OFCs”) can be classified into three groups: functional, 
compound, and national. A  functional OFC can be defined as being where financial activities 
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centres go hand-in-hand as tax benefits often drive the structuring of business 
vehicles and transactions. The OECD2 defines a tax haven as a jurisdiction 
where: 
 
(a) There are no or only nominal taxes (and offering, or being 
perceived as offering, a place for non-residents to escape tax in their 
country of residence); 
There is a lack of transparency (such as the absence of beneficial 
ownership information and bank secrecy); 
(b) There is unwillingness to exchange information with the tax 
administrations of OECD member countries; and 
and there is absence of a requirement that activity be substantial 
(transactions may be “booked” in the country with no or little real 
economic activity). 
International reforms since the early 1990s have changed the 
phenomenon in (c) somewhat as the OECD’s blacklist of 
uncooperative tax havens has forced a number of jurisdictions to sign 
a sufficient number3 of bilateral information exchange treaties with 
other non-haven countries in order to be elevated from the blacklist to 
the grey or white lists.4  
 
Micro-states may find it attractive to run an economic model based on the 
tax haven and/or offshore financial centre as many of them are resource-scarce 
and would not be competitive in global international trade.5  Further, many of 
them were part of old colonial empires, such as the Channel Islands, British 
Virgin Islands, etc., and already benefit from institutional and legal 
infrastructure inherited from the former motherland that could be used to serve 
the needs of multinational corporations and internationally mobile capital.6 The 
former British dependencies and territories have inherited a common law 
system that is friendly to the creation of beneficial ownership structures to 
protect money and assets. 7  This has allowed such jurisdictions to further 
                                                                                                                                
actually take place, where full branches of banks, plus other financial services such as fund 
management, trust companies etc. are sited. Functional OFCs employ a significant proportion of 
local labour. Compound OFCs host a mixture of functional and notional activities. This category 
includes centres (eg. The Bahamas) that have an increasing number of shell offices that eventually 
become fully operational branches. Such OFCs employ a smaller proportion of the local labour 
force than functional OFCs (3-10 %) and contribute an estimated 10-24 % of GDP. Notional OFC 
are where 'shell' or brass plate offices of banks make book entries of financial transactions. 
However, their employment and GDP data is fragmented and incomplete. See Mark P. Hampton, 
Creating Spaces. The Political Economy of Island Offshore Finance Centres: The Case of Jersey, 
84 Geographische Zeitschrift 103 (1996); Godfrey Baldacchino, Bursting the Bubble: The Pseudo-
Development Strategies of Micro-states, 24 Development and Change 29, 29-51 (1993). 
2. Org. For Econ. Co-operation and Dev., Harmful Tax Competition: An Emerging Global 
Issue (Feb. 19, 2016, 3:29 PM), http://www.oecd.org/tax/transparency/44430243.pdf.  
3. At least 12. 
4. Discussed shortly in Section B. 
5. Mark P. Hampton & John Christensen, Offshore Pariahs? Small Island Economies, Tax 
Havens, and the Re-configuration of Global Finance, 30 WORLD DEV. 1657 (2002); Georges A. 
Cavalier, Redesigning Heaven: Tax Haven Reform in the Netherlands Antilles, 38 TAX NOTES 
INT’L 1009 (2005); Dhammika Dharmapala & James R. Hines Jr., Which Countries Become Tax 
Havens? 93 J. PUB. ECON. 1058 (2009).  
6. Mihir A. Desai et al., The Demand for Tax Haven Operations, 90 J. PUB. ECON. 513 
(2006). 
7. Mark P. Hampton & Michael Levi, Fast Spinning into Oblivion? Recent Developments 
in Money-Laundering Policies and Offshore Finance Centres, 20 THIRD WORLD Q. 645 (1999) 
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innovate and develop trust and corporate structures that help multinational 
corporations and wealthy individuals in their tax and financial planning. 
Further, the relatively small populations of micro-states place less public 
spending demands on governments. The relatively light fiscal burdens in these 
micro-states therefore allow such governments to put in place low-tax fiscal 
policies that are outwardly attractive to foreign corporations and fund flows, 
and yet not compromise domestic economic needs.8 In the post-colonial re-
ordering of state sovereignty, Palan9 observes that although micro-states have 
gained new found sovereignty from colonial shackles, they are placed on an 
unequal playing field in the global economy, and hence they have sought 
comparative advantage by developing economic models that plug into the 
growth of internationally mobile capital and finance. Looked at in those terms, 
there has been little choice for micro-states in developing viable economic 
models to survive in the global economy.10 
Micro-states may be regarded as being engaged in international regulatory 
competition for international business and finance. They introduce regulatory 
and tax standards that attract international business and finance, creating 
incentives for their migration from onshore to offshore jurisdictions. They are 
highly responsive in introducing policy measures to attract inflows or stem 
outflows.11 As micro-states usually have small populations and light fiscal 
needs, they enjoy advantages in being able to quickly and responsively 
calibrate their policies to cater to international business needs. This may be 
perceived by onshore jurisdictions as an “unfair” form of competition, usually 
towards laxity in standards.12 On the other hand, regulatory competition can be 
supported as it is key to fostering regulatory innovations,13 achieving optimal 
and efficient rules14 and preventing monopolistic domination over rule-making 
by inefficient constituents.15  Regulatory competition is an important paradigm 
                                                                                                                                
(discussing how former colonial status has helped former British territories- the ties with the 
previous motherland and inheritance of a commercially friendly common law system).  However, 
note Shaxson’s damaging journalistic account of how previous colonial powers continue to use 
their former territories in shady financial dealings, in order for onshore institutions to appear 
disengaged. NICHOLAS SHAXSON, TREASURE ISLANDS: TAX HAVENS AND THE MEN WHO STOLE 
THE WORLD (London Vintage 2012). 
8. Dharmapala & Hines, supra note 5, at 1058. 
9. Ronen Palan, Tax Havens and the Commercialization of State Sovereignty, 56 INT’L 
ORG. 151 (2002). 
10. Cavalier, supra note 5, at 1009. 
11. Roberta Romano, Is Regulatory Competition a Problem or Irrelevant for Corporate 
Governance? 21 OXFORD REV. ECON. POL’Y 212 (2005) [hereinafter Regulatory Competition]. 
12. DALE D. MURPHY, THE STRUCTURE OF REGULATORY COMPETITION: CORPORATIONS 
AND PUBLIC POLICIES IN A GLOBAL ECONOMY (2004).  
13. Roberta Romano, The States as a Laboratory: Legal Innovation and State Competition 
for Corporate Charters, 23 YALE J. ON REG. 209 (2006) [hereinafter The States as a Laboratory]; 
ROBERTA ROMANO, THE GENIUS OF AMERICAN CORPORATE LAW (1993) [hereinafter AMERICAN 
CORPORATE LAW].  
14. Regulatory Competition, supra note 11; The States as a Laboratory, supra note 13.  But 
see Henri Tjiong, Breaking the Spell of Regulatory Competition: Reframing the Problem of 
Regulatory Exit, 66 RABEL J. COMP. & INT’L PRIVATE L. 66; Franklin A. Gevurtz, The 
Globalization of Corporate Law: The End of History or a Never-Ending Story? 86 WASH. L. REV. 
475 (2011); Marcel Kahan & Ehud Kamar, The Myth of State Competition in Corporate Law, 55 
STAN. L. REV. 679 (2002). 
15. William J. Carney, The Political Economy of Competition for Corporate Charters, 26 J. 
LEGAL STUD. 303 (1977). 
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in which to study the phenomena of race to the top16 or bottom,17 or a race to 
converge.18 
Further, it could be argued that micro-states are not engaged in regulatory 
competition as such because they differentiate themselves from onshore 
jurisdictions and other micro-states in the provision of niche services. These 
jurisdictions are not always responding to the same constituents,19 and they are 
not pitting themselves against each other on the same terms.20 On balance, 
micro-states are engaged in both competition and differentiation. Many of them 
do engage in economic modelling that intends to attract highly mobile 
international constituents such as international investment capital,21 and 
multinational corporations, and such models revolve around common attributes 
such as tax, corporate and financial regulation and bank secrecy. But there is 
also a place for economic modelling to cater to other forms of businesses that 
may be less mobile and likely “stick” to the most suitable jurisdiction when 
found;22 for example, registration jurisdictions for ships, that have concentrated 
in the Faroe Islands. Murphy23 argues that much of the state-private sector 
relationship in the modern international economy revolves around both 
competition and differentiation, and different factors would affect the 
trajectories of such relationships. Hence, one may see competition for high 
standards in one area, competition for laxity in another area, convergence in yet 
another area and heterogeneity or differentiation as well. 
                                                          
16. The States as a Laboratory, supra note 13; AMERICAN CORPORATE LAW, supra note 13; 
John C. Coffee, Jr., The Future as History: The Prospects for Global Convergence in Corporate 
Governance and its Implications, 93 N.W. U. L. REV. 641 (1998). 
17. Although when certain demand pressures are strong, jurisdictions could be subject to 
their capture and fashion friendly rules, see Lucian A. Bebchuk & Allen Ferrell, On Takeover Law 
and Regulatory Competition, 57 BUS. LAW. 1047 (2001) (discussing the prevalence of anti-
takeover statutes as a result of American state competition for charters); Luca Enriques & Martin 
Gelter, How the Old World Encountered the New One: Regulatory Competition and Cooperation 
in European Corporate and Bankruptcy Law, 81 TUL. L. REV. 577 (2006) (discussing bankruptcy 
forum shopping in the EU induced by different insolvency rules in Member States). 
18. Claudio M. Radaelli, The Puzzle of Regulatory Competition, 24 J. PUB. POL’Y 1 
(2004); Simon Deakin, Legal Diversity and Regulatory Competition: Which Model for Europe, 12 
EUR. L. J. 440 (2006). 
19. Horst Eidenmüller, The Transnational Law Market, Regulatory Competition, and 
Transnational Corporations, 18 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 707 (2011); Gevurtz, supra note 14 
(arguing that jurisdictions respond to different relevant stakeholder groups and contextual needs 
such as busts or scandals); Tjiong, supra note 14 (arguing that political choices underlie many 
jurisdictions’ decisions in modeling themselves to provide services to international business). 
20. This is because jurisdictions do not merely engage in ‘one-issue’ competition eg tax, 
and offer bundled services and a holistic context for doing business, differentiating themselves 
from each other. see Radaelli, supra note 18; Chris Brummer, Corporate Law Preemption in an 
Age of Global Capital Markets, 81 S. CAL. L. REV. 1067 (2007); Sebastian Mock, Review Essay, 
Perspectives of Regulatory Competition in European Company Law, 6 GER. L.J. 771 (2005). 
21. Several commentators are of the view that jurisdictions for incorporations will become 
more sensitive to the needs of highly mobile investment capital that global business wishes to 
attract. Hence, competition in securities regulation will become more heightened. See William W. 
Bratton & Joseph A. McCahery, The New Economics of Jurisdictional Competition: 
Devolutionary Federalism in a Second-Best World, 86 GEO. L.J. 201 (1997); Ehud Kamar, Beyond 
Competition for Incorporations, 94 GEO L.J. 1725 (2005); Brummer, supra note 20.  
22. Marco Ventoruzzo, “Cost-Based” and “Rule-Based” Regulatory Competition: Markets 
for Corporate Charters in the U.S. and in the E.U., 3 N.Y.U. J.L. & BUS. 91 (2006); J. Samuel 
Barkin, Racing All Over the Place: A Dispersion Model of International Regulatory Competition, 2 
EUR. J. INT’L REL. 171 (2014) (arguing that jurisdictions will then fashion their regulatory 
standards for retention of such business). 
23. MURPHY, supra note 12. 
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Many micro-states have focused on regulatory competition in tax in order 
to attract international financial flows and corporations.  The low tax strategy 
has caused ire in the international community as critics regard the tax haven 
economic model as providing harmful tax arbitrage and competition.24 A 
catalogue of behaviour by multinational corporations that use tax havens could 
adversely affect the level of tax revenues that home countries of such 
corporations can collect. For example, multinational corporations use tax 
havens to keep foreign income so that tax paid to the home country will be 
minimized.25 Governments of mobile multinational corporations are forced to 
keep taxes sub-optimally low so that the wholesale migration of such 
corporations would be prevented.26 In either case, the home country suffers a 
reduction in tax revenues and hence is able to spend less on public welfare, 
decreasing welfare levels overall in the home country. This view would place 
tax haven jurisdictions in the negative light of being parasitic economies and 
‘stealing’ from non-haven jurisdictions.27  However such behaviour is usually 
structured in a way that is nevertheless legal, and Sharman is of the view that 
micro-states therefore peddle a form of “calculated ambiguity”28 to further 
arbitrage behaviour by multinational corporations. Such calculated ambiguity 
is made possible as it is backed by the sovereignty of the micro-state and its 
legal independence, However, the micro-state commercializes its sovereignty 
and legal independence in order serve the needs of international finance and 
multinational corporations. This could also result in a race to the bottom in 
terms of governance standards, a competition in laxity.29 
Further, micro-states often institute bank secrecy laws that complement the 
tax haven/offshore financial centre economic models. Bank secrecy is highly 
desirable to users of tax havens or offshore financial centres as privacy in 
individual financial affairs or in corporate structuring is often valued even if 
legality is not in question. Bank secrecy regimes, however, may be perceived 
as reinforcing the economic injustice to non-haven jurisdictions, as these 
regimes limit information transparency,30 even under bilateral exchange 
treaties,31 and could create obstacles to regulatory investigations and 
enforcement. Tax authorities in home country jurisdictions face an uphill task 
and significant enforcement cost if they desire to recoup revenues lost to tax 
havens through tax evasion. Bank secrecy provides a pocket of localization and 
                                                          
24. Harmful Tax Competition, supra note 2. 
25. David W. Conklin & Darroch A. Robertson, Tax Havens: Investment Distortions and 
Policy Options, 25 CAN. PUB. POL’Y 333 (1999). 
26. Joel Slemrod & John D. Wilson, Tax Competition With Parasitic Tax Havens, 93 J. 
PUB. ECON. 1261 (2009). 
27. Id. at 1262. 
28. Jason Sharman, Offshore and the New International Political Economy, 17 REV. OF 
INT’L POL. ECON. 1, 2-12 (2010). 
29. Murphy, supra note 12 (opining that indeed in some areas, offshore regulatory 
competition has resulted in a race to the bottom, such as in offshore finance. However some would 
disagree). See, e.g., Rose-Marie Belle Antoine, The Legitimacy of the Offshore Financial Sector: A 
Legal Perspective, in OFFSHORE FINANCIAL CENTERS AND REGULATORY COMPETITION  31-32 
(Andrew P. Morriss ed., 2010). 
30. Clemens Fuest, Tax Havens: Shady Deals, WORLD TODAY, July 2011, at 17; Timothy 
V. Addison, Shooting Blanks: The War on Tax Havens, 16 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 703, 710-
11, 718 (2009); Guttorm Schjelderup, Secrecy Jurisdictions, 23 INT’L TAX & PUB. FIN. 168, 169-
172 (2016). 
31. John Christensen, The Hidden Trillions: Secrecy, Corruption, and the Offshore 
Interface, 57 CRIME, L. & SOC. CHANGE 325, 327-28 (2012); Addison, supra note 30, at 717-19. 
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shelter in an internationally connected global economy,32 keeping key 
information opaque from enforcement authorities. Moreover it may assist in 
more nefarious behaviour that may involve illegality on the part of 
corporations and individuals, corruption involving politicians, especially of 
emerging economies, and increasingly terrorist financing for rogue 
organizations. Commentators have pointed out the complementarity of bank 
secrecy regimes33 for money-laundering activities, and for the sheltering of ill-
gotten gains such as bribes accumulated by corrupt politicians and government 
officials in emerging economies. To a certain extent, the existence of bank 
secrecy regimes that harbour corrupt politicians’ and officials’ ill-gotten gains 
also facilitate revenue drain from the development needs of emerging 
economies,34 entrenching them in an abject state of institutional 
underdevelopment35 and social poverty, even if they are resource rich. 
In defence, commentators on the point of tax competition argue that tax 
havens provide a necessary competitive force that entail beneficial effects for 
home countries despite the loss in tax revenues. Such beneficial effects include 
the generation of financial and legal innovations,36 the development of more 
competitive tax regimes37 and banking sectors,38 and the general upgrading of 
regulatory standards. These arguments are contrary to the theorists who argue 
that regulatory competition led by tax havens results in a race to the bottom.39 
Further, the tax haven should be regarded as part of the larger context for 
productive activity. It is opined that foreign investment into neighbouring 
countries of tax havens increase because of the existence of the tax haven 
which provides tax planning and financial services support for the economic 
activities in the region.40 Some empirical research found that foreign 
investment flows into non-haven jurisdictions located within geographical 
proximity of the tax haven increase as a result of use of the tax haven.41  
Commentators in defence of the economic model of micro-states have however 
found that these micro-states do not lead a race to the bottom in regulatory 
                                                          
32. S. Corkill Cobb, Global Finance and the Growth of Offshore Financial Centers: The 
Manx Experience, 29 GEOFORUM 7 (1998). 
33. Jack A. Blum, Michael Levi, R. Thomas Nayior & Phil Williams, Financial Havens, 
Banking Secrecy and Money Laundering, CRIME PREVENTION & CRIM. JUST. NEWSL., May 1998, 
as summarized in TRENDS ORGANIZED CRIME, June 1999, at 69-70; Peter Schwarz, Money 
Launderers and Tax Havens: Two Sides of the Same Coin?, 31 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 37, 43 
(2011). 
34. Shafik Hebous & Vilen Lipatov, A Journey from a Corruption Port to a Tax Haven 
(CESifo, Working Paper No. 3620, 2011); Addison, supra note 30, at 707-08. 
35. William Vlcek, The Global Pursuit of Tax Revenue: Would Tax Haven Reform Equal 
Increased Tax Revenues in Developing States?, 27 GLOBAL SOC’Y 201, 203-05 (2013). 
36. Antoine, supra note 29. 
37. Dhammika Dharmapala, What Problems and Opportunities are Created by Tax 
Havens?, 24 OXFORD REV. ECON. POL’Y 661, 671-72 (2008). 
38. Andrew K. Rose & Mark M. Spiegel, Offshore Financial Centres: Parasites or 
Symbionts?,, 117 ECON. J. 1310, 1325-31 (2007); Hebous & Lipatov, supra note 34; Anna 
Manasco Dionne & Jonathan R Macey, Offshore Finance and Onshore Markets: Racing to the 
Bottom, or Moving Toward Efficient? in OFFSHORE FINANCIAL CENTERS AND REGULATORY 
COMPETITION 8 (Andrew P. Morriss ed., 2010). 
39. Dionne & Macey, supra note 38; Craig M. Boise, Regulating Tax Competition in 
Offshore Financial Centers in OFFSHORE FINANCIAL CENTERS AND REGULATORY COMPETITION 
50 (Andrew P. Morriss ed., 2010). 
40. James R Hines, Jr., Do Tax Havens Flourish? (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, 
Working Paper No. 10936, 2004); James R. Hines, Jr. & Eric M. Rice, Fiscal Paradise: Foreign 
Tax Havens and American Business, 109 Q.J. ECON. 149, 154-55 (1994). 
41. Dharmapala, supra note 37, at 671. 
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standards. Micro-states need to defend the reputation of their jurisdiction as a 
credible jurisdiction for corporations and financial structuring, and they 
generally institute sound regulation and good political and administrative 
governance. In particular, although they support financial innovation, they are 
not welcoming to illegal activities such as money-laundering.42 The emphasis 
placed on reputational branding by micro-state policy-makers have helped 
secure many of their economic models from being savaged by the international 
community in light of the post- 9/11 expansion in international anti-money 
laundering standard-setting.43 Only the less reputable micro-states tend to be a 
hub for such nefarious activities.44 Moreover a commentator45 points out that 
money laundering is a systemic underground operation that spans the globe, 
and both onshore and offshore jurisdictions are used by determined launderers. 
It is therefore not accurate to assert that micro-states are primarily connected to 
such operations. Many micro-states indeed institute anti-money laundering 
regulations consistent with international standards.46  
Although micro-states institute bank secrecy regimes, such regimes should 
not be condemned as necessarily hiding nefarious activities. Bank secrecy can 
be regarded as a means to protect individual rights and privacy where those 
may be under threat. For example, bank secrecy can be used to protect the 
assets of entrepreneurs of oppressive regimes whose assets may otherwise be 
expropriated by corrupt and powerful politicians and bureaucrats.47 In sum, 
although micro-states compete with onshore jurisdictions and have the 
potential to undermine their fiscal policies, they provide regional economic 
benefits, are not necessarily in a race to the bottom in terms of regulatory 
standards and do not necessarily shelter nefarious activities such as money 
laundering and terrorist financing.  
II. FROM MULTILATERAL APPROACHES TO UNILATERAL APPROACHES AGAINST 
THE ECONOMIC MODELS OF MICRO-STATES 
It may be argued that many micro-states operate economic models that sit 
uneasily at the borderline of regulatory competition and simply regulatory 
                                                          
42. Dharmapala & Hines, supra note 5, at 1061; Andrew. P Morriss & Clifford C. Henson, 
Regulatory Effectiveness in Onshore & Offshore Financial Centers, 4-8, 14, 32 (The Univ. of Ala. 
Sch. of Law, Working Paper, 2012)  http://ssrn.com/abstract=2016310). 
43. J. C. SHARMAN, HAVENS IN A STORM: THE STRUGGLE FOR GLOBAL TAX REGULATION 
107 (2006). 
44. Schwarz, supra note 33, at 39. 
45. JACK A. BLUM ET. AL., U.N. OFFICE FOR DRUG CONTROL AND CRIME PREVENTION, 
FINANCIAL HAVENS, BANKING SECRECY, AND MONEY LAUNDERING (1998), reprinted in TRENDS 
IN THE GLOBAL DRUG TRADE Dec. 1998, at 121. 
46. For example, the Channel Islands, former UK Commonwealth countries all have in 
place anti-money laundering laws, derived from the international standards forged by the Financial 
Action Task Force since 1990. See FINANCIAL ACTION TASK FORCE ON MONEY LAUNDERING: 
REPORT (1990), http://www.fatf-gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/reports/1990%20ENG.pdf. The US 
remains able to enforce anti-money laundering laws against US Commonwealth jurisdictions such 
as some of the Pacific Islands, e.g. fine against a North Mariana Islands casino operator in July 
2015. See also Previous Symposia, THE CAMBRIDGE INT’L SYMPOSIUM ON ECON. CRIME, 
http://www.crimesymposium.org/prev.html (last visited Feb. 14, 2016)(discussing the risks of 
managing money laundering in onshore and offshore jurisdictions in the annual Jesus College 
Cambridge Financial Crime Symposium which has been instituted by Professor Barry Rider since 
2000). 
47. Andrew Morriss, The Role of Offshore Financial Centers in Regulatory Competition, 
70 (Ill. Law & Econ. Research Paper Series, Research Paper No. LE07-032), 
http://papers.ssrn.com/pape.tar?abstract_id=1275390. 
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arbitrage in tax. This ‘calculated ambiguity’48 has been criticised at the 
international level. Issues of unfair tax competition have been addressed by the 
OECD, as the cohort of onshore jurisdictions led by the OECD has since the 
early 1990s developed mechanisms of multilateral engagement with micro-
states.  
The OECD’s blacklisting approach is an early multilateral approach in 
attempting to extend international governance to micro-states to mitigate unfair 
tax competition is the OECD’s blacklisting approach. The OECD has since 
1998 maintained a list of Uncooperative Tax Havens. This list names and 
shames jurisdictions that do not have in place bilateral arrangements with other 
tax authorities to cooperate and assist in tax enforcement. However, even with 
such bilateral treaties in place, tax havens would only be obliged to supply 
information under well-constructed data protection regimes, if the requesting 
jurisdiction provides very specific identification information. However, 
bilateral information exchange has not worked well in practice, as it is up to 
onshore tax authorities to discover potential enforcement targets and then seek 
help from micro-state jurisdictions. Micro-states do not offer this information 
as they adhere to their bank secrecy regimes.49 Nevertheless, by signing up to 
bilateral treaties, micro-state jurisdictions that maintain tax advantages are 
entitled to be removed from the blacklist. By 2009, all remaining countries on 
the blacklist have been removed. A number of commentators argue that the 
blacklist has been an ineffective means of governing unfair tax competition in 
the international legal order, as it provides a box-ticking means of compliance 
which ultimately does not challenge micro-states’ economic models. 50  
It can be argued that multilateral measures such as carried out under the 
auspices of the OECD are ineffective as micro-states would only do what is 
minimal and cosmetic in order to appear diplomatic. However, there is a limit 
to what multilateral approaches can achieve. Multilateral approaches are 
negotiated, and are framed in a proportionate manner so that relatively 
developed and wealthy OECD countries are not seen as unfairly persecuting or 
bullying essentially defenceless micro-states. Sharman51 discusses how the 
OECD’s efforts have largely become rhetorical and restrained, leading to a 
tacit compromise not to severely damage micro-states’ economic model as long 
as more cooperation can be secured. Many micro-states such as the Channel 
Islands, and island states that are part of the British Commonwealth 
nevertheless take care to adhere to international regulatory standards such as in 
anti-money laundering and financial regulation in order not to engage in 
egregious behaviour that may attract unwanted attention to themselves.  
The OECD has also developed a multilateral Model Tax Convention52 
since 1993 that seeks to ensure that onshore jurisdictions have the right to tax 
relevant income that may be made or paid by an offshore entity subject to 
double taxation arrangements, and that all states should assist each other in 
                                                          
48. Sharman, supra note 28, at 2. 
49. Niels Johannesen & Gabriel Zucman, The End of Bank Secrecy? An Evaluation of the 
G20 Tax Haven Crackdown, 6 AMERICAN ECON. J.: ECON. POL’Y 65, 68-69 (2014). 
50. Robert Thomas Kudrle, Did Blacklisting Hurt the Tax Havens? 12 J. MONEY 
LAUNDERING CONTROL 33, 45 (2009); Addison, supra note 30, at 714-16. 
51. See Sharman, supra note 43, at 49-100. 
52. See OECD Model Tax Convention on Income and on Capital: An Overview of 
Available Products, ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV. 
http://www.oecd.org/ctp/treaties/oecd-model-tax-convention-available-products.htm (last visited 
Feb. 18, 2016). 
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exchange of information and revenue collection. The Convention has been 
adopted by many jurisdictions but not by many micro-states offering offshore 
tax and financial centres.53 
Since the global financial crisis of 2007-9, there has been a marked change 
in the international legal order. In particular, we observe that there is a move 
away from multilateral mechanisms to engage micro-states, to unilateral 
mechanisms introduced in individual and powerful onshore jurisdictions. 
Instead of negotiating with micro-states for more transparency and cooperation 
at the multilateral level, onshore jurisdictions could enact and enforce national 
legislation with powerful extra-territorial effects. The US’s Foreign Accounts 
Tax Compliance Act (FATCA) and the slightly more restrained European 
equivalent in the Savings Directive54 introduce transparency requirements that 
have the potential to completely undermine micro-states’ bank secrecy 
regimes. In the UK, the Finance Act 2016 introduces a package of measures to 
combat tax evasion and aggressive tax planning. The Act provides for 
mandatory reporting with an international reach in relation to tax planning. 
Such requirements, as will be discussed below, amount to a form of 
organisational and behavioural regulation of multinational corporations whose 
headquarters are in the UK. The Act also provides for robust administrative, 
civil and criminal sanctions to combat undesirable tax behaviour in ‘large 
businesses’.55 Finally, the EU has enacted new financial regulation reforms 
which make it less attractive for international business and finance to use 
offshore financial centres. These measures have far more potency than 
multilateral measures discussed earlier as they affect the incentives of global 
corporations and finance and force them to make choices that may marginalise 
the use of offshore tax and financial centres. Further, these measures are 
subject to national enforcement, which may more effectively achieve onshore 
jurisdictions’ purposes than relying on the international order of multilateral 
negotiations between states.  
We now turn to examine why the change from multilateral to unilateral 
approaches has taken place in the international legal order. We argue below 
that changes in the political economy of finance is the principal driving factor, 
and this represents a turning point in the international governance framework 
for micro-states’ tax and financial competition models. 
A. Driving Factors for Unilateral Approaches against Micro-states- Changes 
in the Political Economy of Finance and Post-Global Financial Crisis Reforms  
The global financial crisis 2007-9 is a turning point for the continued 
sustainability of micro-states’ economic models not because the crisis is 
directly attributed to their economic models, but rather, because the crisis 
brought about changes in international policy perspectives and the power 
                                                          
53. The current signatories (end 2015) to the Convention are: Albania, Argentina, Australia, 
Austria, Belgium, Belize, Brazil, Canada, Colombia, Costa Rica, Czech Republic, Denmark, 
Estonia, Finland, France, Georgia, Germany, Ghana, Greece, Guatemala, Iceland, India, Indonesia, 
Ireland, Italy, Japan, Korea, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Mexico, Moldova, Morocco, 
Netherlands, New Zealand, Nigeria, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Russian Federation, 
Saudi Arabia, Singapore, Slovenia, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Tunisia, Turkey, Ukraine, United 
Kingdom, and United States of America. 
54. Council Directive 2011/16, 2011 O.J. (L 64)(EU). 
55. HM TREASURY, DRAFT CLAUSES & EXPLANATORY NOTES FOR FINANCE BILL 2016, 
2015, ¶ 65 (UK). 
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balance between state and private actors in the realm of finance. In particular, 
onshore jurisdictions with developed financial markets that used to co-exist 
with offshore tax and financial centres have introduced more antagonistic 
measures to combat old issues, and also exploring new faultlines. 
We argue that the unilateral measures introduced by the US, EU and UK 
are driven by three broad contexts that have reshaped the political economy of 
finance. First, the international financial sector, a powerful lobby that supports 
the offshore tax and financial centre models of micro-states have been humbled 
to a significant extent in the wake of the global financial crisis. This change in 
power balance between state and private actors has opened up an opportunity 
for more aggressive policy measures to be introduced in many national 
jurisdictions, to combat old issues that have been resistant to progress. Second, 
the US, many EU jurisdictions and the UK have experienced severe fiscal 
stresses due to the unprecedented use of taxpayers’ money to bail out failed 
financial institutions. These new fiscal demands have resulted in austerity 
policies in these jurisdictions, entailing issues of tax justice to be brought back 
into sharp focus. Finally, the rise of rogue states such as the Islamic State in the 
Middle East, terrorism in Western jurisdictions, and conflict financing in 
various regions of conflict have given rise to questions regarding international 
governance of financial flows, and in particular have provided strong rationale 
for Western jurisdictions affected by extreme Islamist terrorism to take a wide 
range of regulatory measures to protect themselves. 
Taking the first broad context, the balance of power between the 
international financial sector and national (and international) policy makers has 
changed in the wake of the global financial crisis. This paradigmatic shift has 
occurred as the failure of a number of global financial institutions in the crisis 
has humbled the financial sector, and policy-makers’ faith in the self-
governance of the financial sector has waned.  The power of the international 
financial sector is arguably important for sustaining micro-states’ economic 
models. These models are friendly for transactional purposes in international 
finance,56 and it may be conceived that these models continued to flourish in 
the pre-crisis era despite the discontented critique of the OECD and many non-
haven jurisdictions precisely because the lobbying power of the international 
financial sector has prevented harsher international measures against them.57 
As the crisis has led to the re-adjustment of power balance between the 
international financial sector and policy-makers in national and international 
outfits, micro-states may be less able to count on powerful support from the 
international financial sector against calls for reform. 
As the crisis has been analysed and discussed extensively in previous 
literature,58 this article will not belabour the narrative of the crisis further 
except to remind of the fact that the crisis, though termed as ‘global’, affected 
most acutely the US, several European jurisdictions and the UK, where 
significant banks failed or teetered on the brink of failure. Government 
intervention was needed in the case of Bear Stearns, Merrill Lynch and 
                                                          
56. Hampton & Christensen, supra note 5, at 1653-57; Palan, supra note 9. 
57. Although Sharman argues that corporate lobbying power was not as significant as the 
moral rhetoric relating to protecting havens from bullying and the economic rhetoric relating to 
competition which havens championed. See Sharman, supra note 43, at 64. 
58. E.g., HOWARD DAVIES, THE FINANCIAL CRISIS: WHO IS TO BLAME? (2009); Adair 
Turner, The Turner Review: A Regulatory Response to the Global Banking Crisis, FIN. SERV. 
AUTH. (Mar. 2009), http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pubs/other/turner_review.pdf. 
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Washington Mutual in the US, although Lehman Brothers was allowed to fail. 
In the EU, government intervention took place in relation to Fortis and Dexia, 
and in relation to the Halifax Bank of Scotland in the UK. Government bailout 
occurred in the US in relation to the American Insurance Group, and in the EU, 
for UBS, Rabobank and HypoReal Estate, while the Royal Bank of Scotland 
and Northern Rock were rescued in the UK. 
The humbling of the financial sector in this episode paved the way for 
much financial regulation reforms to be introduced in the US, EU and UK, 
reforms that would likely have been resisted in the good times. Although the 
crisis has led to a general overhaul of international regulatory standards such as 
led by the Basel Committee,59 the US, EU and UK have overhauled their 
regimes by the greatest extent, implementing internationally harmonised 
standards in prudential regulation60 but also taking the opportunity to reform 
conduct of business regulation, corporate and tax regulation.61  
The powerful international financial sector has played a large part in 
advancing self-regulatory governance, setting standards62 and influencing 
government policies.63 Pre-crisis, much of financial sector innovation was 
possible in a largely de-regulated and self-governing landscape, and financial 
innovation was intimately connected with use of offshore tax and financial 
centres.64 Much financial innovation and complexity is made possible by the 
use of offshore business vehicle or fund structures and offshore financial 
services, as favourable tax treatments reduce cost for investors. The crisis has 
gravely damaged policy-makers’ trust in the sophisticated and de-regulated 
                                                          
59. BASEL COMM. ON BANKING SUPERVISION, BASEL III: A GLOBAL REGULATORY 
FRAMEWORK FOR MORE RESILIENT BANKS AND BANKING SYSTEMS (2011), 
http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs189.pdf.  
60. Microprudential regulation was strengthened by the Basel Committee and in the EU and 
remains an ongoing process, see MADS ANDENAS & IRIS H-Y CHIU, THE FOUNDATIONS AND 
FUTURE OF FINANCIAL REGULATION: GOVERNANCE FOR RESPONSIBILITY 332-56 (2014) and 
citations therein for Basel Committee documents, EU policy papers and legislation, including the 
Capital Requirements Directive and Regulation 2014. Reforms are also brought in in terms of 
crisis management and resolution, see Council Directive 2014/59, 2014 O.J. (L 173) (EU). The 
book above generally deals with different aspects of financial regulation reforms that have been 
introduced in the wake of the crisis to strengthen prudential, conduct and risk regulation. 
61. Key aspects of which that affect offshore tax and financial centres will be discussed in 
Section C. 
62. Geoffrey R.D. Underhill, Markets beyond Politics? The State and the 
Internationalisation of Financial Markets, 19 EUR. J. POL. RES. 197, 215-21 (1991); Geoffery R.D. 
Underhill, Theorizing Governance in a Global Financial System, in THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF 
FINANCIAL MARKET REGULATION: THE DYNAMICS OF INCLUSION AND EXCLUSION 3-33 (Peter 
Mooslechner, Helene Schuberth & Beat Weber eds., 2006; Geoffrey R.D. Underhill & Xiaoke 
Zhang, Norms, Legitimacy, and Global Financial Governance, 32-34 (World Econ. & Fin. 
Research Programme, WEF 0013, 2006), 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=941389; Sol Piccioto & Jason Haines, 
Regulating Global Financial Markets, 26 J.L. & SOC’Y 351, 365-67 (1999); Caroline Bradley, 
Private International Law-Making for the Financial Markets, 29 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 127, 133-54 
(2005). 
63. Simon Deakin, The Rise Of Finance: What Is It, What Is Driving It, What Might Stop 
It? A Comment on “Finance and Labor: Perspectives on Risk, Inequality, and Democracy” by 
Sanford Jacoby, 30 COMP. LAB. L. & POL’Y J. 67 (2008) (for example the abolition of the US 
Glass-Steagall Act which then allowed the growth of financial conglomerates in the US and 
beyond); SUZANNE MCGEE, CHASING GOLDMAN SACHS: HOW THE MASTERS OF THE UNIVERSE 
MELTED WALL STREET DOWN…AND WHY THEY’LL TAKE US TO THE BRINK AGAIN (2010). 
64. Ronen Palan & Anastasia Nesvetailova, The Governance of the Black Holes of the 
World Economy: Shadow Banking and Offshore Finance (City Political Econ. Research Ctr., 
CITYPERC Working Paper No. 2013/03), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2216795. 
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international financial sector.65 Financial innovations and complexity 
introduced by the lightly regulated financial sector have not achieved optimal 
distribution of risk66 but have in fact lulled all into a false sense of security 
which could not be sustained. 67 The post-crisis scepticism of the utility of 
much financial innovation68 and complexity69 would cast micro-states that 
facilitate such structuring in less positive light. Further, financial scandals that 
have involved the use of tax haven or offshore financial structures also cause 
reputational backlashes for certain micro-states. For example, the ponzi scheme 
run by Allen Stanford that involved using Antiguan offshore financial vehicles 
has resulted in a reputational backlash against Antigua.70 The use of offshore 
vehicles to hide losses by Enron in order to mislead investors through 
deceptive financial reporting was also an episode that cast micro-states’ 
economic models in negative light.71 Financial regulation reforms are now 
introduced to affect choices that are made in respect of the use of offshore 
jurisdictions in financial structuring, which we will shortly discuss in greater 
detail.  
Second, bank bailouts have put enormous fiscal pressures on the above 
mentioned national governments72 and have now caused them to turn to the 
potential of recouping tax revenues lost to tax havens.73 Hence, the US, EU and 
UK have introduced unilateral regimes that form different lines of attack 
against the offshore tax haven model. The biggest major step taken by the US 
is the controversial American regime, the Foreign Account Tax Compliance 
Act (FATCA) which came into force in 2014. This regime threatens to 
undermine the bank secrecy regimes maintained by offshore tax and financial 
centres. The EU has a more limited regime under the EU Savings Directive 
amended as of 2014.74 These initiatives could make secrecy regimes redundant 
                                                          
65. Turner, supra note 58, at 39-42; MARKUS BRUNNERMEIER ET AL., THE FUNDAMENTAL 
PRINCIPLES OF FINANCIAL REGULATION (2009). 
66. Sugato Bhattacharyya & Amiyatosh Purnanandam, Risk-Taking by Banks: What Did 
We Know and When Did We Know It? (Nov. 18, 2011) (unpublished manuscript) available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1619472; Emilios Avgouleas, Regulating Financial Innovation: A 
Multifaceted Challenge to Financial Stability, Consumer Protection, and Growth, in OXFORD 
HANDBOOK OF FINANCIAL REGULATION (Niamh Moloney et al. eds., 2015). 
67. Richard E. Mendales, Collateralized Explosive Devices: Why Securities Regulation 
Failed to Prevent the CDO Meltdown, and How to Fix It, 2009 U. ILL. L. REV. 1359, 1361-63 
(2009). 
68. Avgouleas, supra note 66. 
69. Dan Awrey, Complexity, Innovation and the Regulation of Modern Financial Markets, 
2 Harv. Bus. L. Rev. 235, 279 (2012). 
70. Nick Davis, Allen Stanford: Antigua Feels the Fallout of Ponzi Case, BBC NEWS (Mar 
8, 2012), http://www.bbc.com/news/business17298267. 
71. See David Cay Johnston, Enron's Collapse: The Havens; Enron Avoided Income Taxes 
In 4 of 5 Years, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 17, 2002), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2002/01/17/business/enronscollapsethehavensenronavoidedincometaxesi
n4of5years.html (Enron used over 900 offshore vehicles to hide liabilities and losses, 692 in the 
Cayman Islands, 119 in the Turks and Caicos, 43 in Mauritius and 8 in Bermuda). 
72. See, e.g., Emma Rowley, Bank Bail-out Adds £1.5 Trillion to Debt, TELEGRAPH (Jan. 
16, 2011, 8:45 AM GMT), 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/newsbysector/banksandfinance/8262037/Bankbailoutadds1.5tri
lliontodebt.html. 
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and the economic model of many micro-state tax havens unsustainable. A 
number of offshore jurisdictions have been forced to reform their secrecy 
regimes and become more cooperative with onshore jurisdictions.75 Further, 
the UK has also embarked on new initiatives to force disclosure of large 
businesses’ tax strategies, discourage aggressive tax planning by large 
businesses76 and to dismantle supporting infrastructures for tax avoidance.77 
The extra-territorial effect of such new legislation allows the UK to carry out 
unilateral measures against multinational corporations and international 
financial institutions. These are intended to undermine micro-states’ 
competitive edge in tax competition and could effectively change the choices 
made by international business and finance. 
Finally, with the rise of rogue regimes such as the Islamic State in the 
Middle East, extreme acts of terrorism in Western jurisdictions, and opacity 
surrounding the financing of internal conflict in a number of jurisdictions such 
as in Syria and the Democratic Republic of Congo, there is a call for greater 
transparency in international financial flows and strengthening of anti-financial 
crime regimes to attack terrorist financing. Developed jurisdictions such as the 
US and UK have introduced extensive financial sanctions,78 and if effectively 
carried out, the disengagement of the international financial sector from rogue 
or conflict jurisdictions could play a significant part in choking finance to these 
jurisdictions, curtailing their capacities to perpetuate conflict and other 
nefarious activities. Bank secrecy regimes maintained by offshore tax and 
financial centres may be seen to be an impediment to the effective enforcement 
of sanctions and the international legal order against the rise of rogue states and 
entities. Hence geopolitical changes have placed immense pressures on micro-
states to change their old models in order to participate in the international 
governance of rogue and terrifying behaviour, and not to become part of the 
rogue community. 
The international legal order has greatly changed in the wake of the global 
financial crisis, as shifts have occurred in the political economy of finance and 
geopolitical landscape. These have given rise to game-changing moments for 
certain affected onshore jurisdictions such as the US, EU and UK, which took 
the opportunity to introduce rather spectacularly antagonistic regulatory 
reforms that affect offshore tax and financial centres. These unilateral measures 
                                                          
75. See, e.g., James Shotter, Switzerland Unveils Draft Laws to Dismantle Bank Secrecy, 
FIN. TIMES 
 (Jan. 14, 2015, 6:15 PM), 
http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/05c2d0989bed11e4b6cc00144feabdc0. 
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76. HM REVENUE & CUSTOMS, IMPROVING LARGE BUSINESS TAX COMPLIANCE: 
CONSULTATION DOCUMENT, 2015 (UK).  
77. HM REVENUE & CUSTOMS, TACKLING OFFSHORE TAX EVASION: A NEW CRIMINAL 
OFFENCE FOR OFFSHORE EVADERS: SUMMARY OF RESPONSES, 2015 (UK); HM REVENUE & 
CUSTOMS, TACKLING OFFSHORE TAX EVASION: A NEW CORPORATE CRIMINAL OFFENCE OF 
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78. See Financial Sanctions: Regime-Specific Lists and Releases, Gov.UK 
 (last updated Feb. 8, 2016), https://www.gov.uk/government/collections/financial-sanctions-
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are largely unresisted to date and may give rise to gradual international 
convergence.79 We now turn to discuss key aspects of these unilateral measures 
that are game-changing for the offshore tax and financial centres. 
III. KEY ASPECTS OF TAX AND FINANCIAL REGULATION REFORMS IN THE US, 
EU AND UK 
A. The Rise of Automatic Information Reporting Regimes 
In 2011, the US passed the HIRE Act in which the FATCA was introduced 
to come into force in 2014. The FATCA achieves an astonishing level of extra-
territoriality. It requires all United States citizens, including individuals who 
live outside the United States, to report their financial accounts held outside of 
the United States. It also requires all global non-US financial institutions to 
search their records for accounts associated with suspected US citizens, in 
order to report their assets and identities to the US Treasury.  The FATCA 
introduces comprehensive and costly compliance for foreign financial 
institutions in order to make reports to the US Treasury, on the pain of 
suffering a withholding tax of 30% on all US-sourced income if the foreign 
financial institution fails to comply.80 This has given rise to an ‘automatic 
information reporting’ regime whereby the onus is reversed onto financial 
institutions to supply tax intelligence to national authorities. National 
authorities need not go through the inconvenient processes of trying to uncover 
opaque tax information in order to initiate exchange of information with tax 
haven jurisdictions. 
By requiring global financial institutions to report on US citizens’ 
accounts and assets abroad, FATCA effectively rides roughshod over tax 
havens’ secrecy regimes and renders the opacity services provided by tax 
havens and offshore financial centres redundant for US citizens. Some 
commentators81 are of the view that FATCA has finally brought about an 
effective regime to end tax avoidance by US citizens. Grinberg82 is of the view 
that the global financial sector is well-placed to serve as information 
intermediaries for national revenues and should be put to work to end the 
artificially sheltered opacity83 sustained by tax havens. Further, commentators84 
also think that FATCA would spawn international convergence towards an 
automatic information reporting system that is imposed on global financial 
                                                          
79. See OECD, STANDARD FOR AUTOMATIC EXCHANGE OF FINANCIAL INFORMATION IN 
TAX MATTERS (2014) (OECD is developing international convergence in automatic information 
reporting regimes); see also OECD, PUBLIC DISCUSSION DRAFT BEPS ACTION 12: MANDATORY 
DISCLOSURE RULES (2015).  
80. See Mark R. Van Heukelom, The Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act and Foreign 
Insurance Companies: Better To Comply than to Opt Out, 39 J. CORP. L. 155, 159-61 (2013) 
(discussing the FATCA provisions). 
81. Susan C. Morse, Tax Compliance and Norm Formation Under High-Penalty Regimes, 
44 CONN. L. REV. 675, 678-79 (2012); Joshua D. Blank & Ruth Mason, Exporting FATCA (NYU 
Law & Econ. Research Series, Working Paper No. 14-05, 2014), 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2389500. 
82. Itai Grinberg, Beyond FATCA: An Evolutionary Moment for the International Tax 
System (Jan. 27, 2012) (unpublished manuscript) available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1996752. 
83. Cobb, supra note 32. 
84. Morse, supra note 81; Blank & Mason, supra note 81, at 1245; Grinberg, supra note 82, 
at 56-61; Luzius U. Cavelti, Automatic Information Exchange Versus the Withholding Tax Regime 
Globalization and Increasing Sovereignty Conflicts in International Taxation, 5 WORLD TAX J. 
172, 209-10 (2013).  
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intermediaries.85 This may become the new standardised order in fighting tax 
avoidance and in instituting a new tax morale. Support for the automatic 
information regime is also compounded by fears of the rise of rogue states and 
conflict financing.  Micro-states would be under increased international 
pressure to ensure that they are in cooperation with sanctions regimes and not 
privy to financing internationally anti-social and dangerous behaviour. 
On the downside, FATCA affects many US citizens living and legitimately 
earning incomes abroad, and the low reporting threshold of $50,000 means that 
a wide net of US expatriates will be caught. One commentator86 laments the 
excessive inconvenience this may cause to US citizens living abroad if foreign 
institutions that serve a small number of US citizen accounts decide to 
withdraw services. Further, FATCA may result in diminished investment and 
dealings with US companies and persons, and creates new burdens for an 
already-burdened banking sector that has to cope with complying with many 
new regulations since the global financial crisis. 
Other commentators are opposed to FATCA as it is intrusive and 
unnecessary. Karundia87 is of the view that FATCA does not respect treaties 
that the US has signed with existing information exchange partners and is a 
form of overwhelming extra-territoriality. Bean and Wright88 view the FATCA 
as intrusive as it impinges on the right of sovereign states to order their tax 
regimes and govern banking secrecy, and such ‘egregious extra-territoriality’ 
amounts to a form of American imperialism. Other commentators89 are also of 
the view that FATCA is unnecessarily extensive and harsh as the objective of 
tax revenue collections could be achieved by negotiating withholding tax 
regimes with other states. It is not necessary to bulldoze over other 
jurisdictions’ banking secrecy regimes in order to recover tax revenues.  
The institution of FATCA has to date compelled many international financial 
institutions to comply for fear of being shut out of the extensive US bond, 
securities and currency markets. It has made a major inroad into the bank 
secrecy regimes of many tax havens and it is now a question whether more 
jurisdictions would follow in the steps of FATCA and make it increasingly 
impossible for tax havens to continue offering their services to international 
finance and business. 
It may be argued that in the EU, a semblance of FATCA-mimicking has 
already taken place. The EU Administration Cooperation Directive90 imposes 
mandatory automatic information reporting on income from employment, life 
insurance products, pensions as well as ownership of and income from real 
                                                          
85. OECD, STANDARD FOR AUTOMATIC EXCHANGE OF FINANCIAL ACCOUNT 
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property. The EU Savings Directive of 201491 now provides that payments of 
interest income, whether directly or indirectly derived, that are made by paying 
agents in the EU to entities (whether onshore or offshore) with a beneficial 
owner resident in the EU must be reported to relevant national authorities in 
order to ascertain the identities of beneficial recipients. Hence automatic 
information reporting is the key mechanism used in the Directives as well, but 
with a more limited scope, as only paying agents in the EU are affected, in 
relation to entities associated with an EU beneficial owner.  Further, EU 
Member States can enter into bilateral arrangements with each other so that the 
financial institution can report to government intermediaries which then 
facilitate information relay. The financial institution may then not need to 
report directly to the beneficial owner’s home jurisdiction. Where beneficial 
owners do not consent to the reporting of their identities by the financial 
institution to their home authorities, a withholding tax of 35% applies. The 
withholding tax allows home authorities to collect revenues although it may be 
perceived to be the price to pay for not consenting to the automatic reporting 
regime. During the transitional period of the Directive, a number of European 
member states such as Austria, Luxembourg and micro-states such as Monaco 
and Liechtenstein, as well as UK Crown dependencies, have all opted to apply 
the withholding tax rather than subvert their bank secrecy regimes.92 EU 
residents are however not absolved from their own reporting obligations.93 
It may be argued that the EU regime is not as extensive and draconian as 
FATCA as FATCA makes major inroads into banking secrecy in addition to 
achieving tax revenue collection. But it is queried whether the EU regime will 
remain nuanced or will be pressured to move towards convergence with 
FATCA. It must be noted that the UK has in late 2013 concluded agreements 
with all of its Crown dependencies to require automatic information reporting 
of UK residents’ income and funds held in such offshore entities regardless of 
where the funds are incorporated and managed or where income is generated 
and received.94 With such automatic reporting obligations in place in favour of 
at least the US and UK, offshore jurisdictions would find it difficult to sustain 
the old economic model which has nevertheless created much wealth and 
prosperity for islanders. 
B. The UK’s Finance Bill 2016 
In the UK, bold new initiatives are being introduced to compel 
transparency of tax behaviour, to strongly discourage tax evasion and 
aggressive tax planning, and to dismantle the structures that assist in such 
behaviour. 
The UK Treasury published a number of consultation papers in the 
summer of 2015 in relation to new criminal sanctions for tax evaders95 and 
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severe civil penalties for them.96 There are already in place financial penalties 
for tax evaders, but the new sanctions would raise the penalties to match the 
values of assets hidden from tax authorities so as to destroy the incentives for 
tax avoidance.  These measures have now been introduced in legislation.97 
Further, the Treasury is targeting large businesses for tax compliant 
behaviour, such large businesses including corporations, partnerships, 
investment funds and other business vehicles whose annual turnover exceeds 
£200 million or whose balance sheet assets amount to at least £2 billion.98 
Large businesses are required to publish their tax strategies and policies in 
relation to a number of specified tax regimes. In particular, groups of 
companies need to publish a group tax strategy. The contents of disclosure are 
not prescribed, and such publication must be made at least 9 months prior to 
the end of the financial year. It is envisaged that the mandatory disclosure of 
“tax strategies” would fit in with the wider corporate narrative reporting 
framework99 introduced earlier that is intended to show how business governs 
itself in relation to performance and compliance. Although the scope of “tax 
strategies” reporting is not defined, we envisage that refinement of 
expectations would likely be achieved through the voluntary code of conduct in 
best practices that the Treasury will establish for tax planning behaviour. Large 
businesses are to comply with the voluntary Code of best practices, and failure 
to do so may result in these businesses being regarded as “uncooperative” and 
“high risk”,100 therefore allowing the Treasury to order them to enter into a 
‘special measures’ regime. Under the regime, increased scrutiny and possible 
withdrawal of privileges such as the ability to tender for government 
procurement would entail, as well as public naming and shaming.101 Such 
special measures would last at least 2 years. 
Finally, enablers or assisters of tax evasion would be subject to severe civil 
penalties too.102 The scope of enablers and assisters is rather wide, and the 
consultation paper provides examples of who may fall within its scope. A 
noted example of interest to micro-state tax havens is that micro-state corporate 
services and financial institutions that provide services to facilitate successful 
tax avoidance would be regarded as an enabler or assister within the scope of 
the proposed legislation. They can be pursued by the UK authorities on an 
extra-territorial basis. However, the penalties will only apply if it is established 
that professional services know that such assistance would likely result in tax 
evasion. The Treasury mooted instituting a criminal penalty for such assisters 
and enablers of tax evasion, but has ultimately dropped the proposal.103 
In sum, the UK has taken bold steps to change incentives on the part of large 
businesses to engage in aggressive tax planning or tax evasion. The purported 
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power to carry out extra-territorial enforcement against individuals in the 
corporate and financial services sector who undertake tax and financial 
planning in onshore and offshore jurisdictions could also be a fearsome 
disincentive for such individuals.  
C. Financial Regulation Reforms and Other Measures that Dis-incentivise the 
Use of Tax Havens 
In the realm of financial regulation, international standards and EU 
legislative reforms introduced post-crisis now make it more costly and/or less 
attractive to use offshore financial centres for financial transaction structuring, 
such as in securitisation and the establishment of investment funds. In the pre-
crisis era, it is arguable that both onshore and offshore financial regulation 
regimes have been similarly de-regulatory where the wholesale sector is 
concerned. 104  This has achieved a form of parity and created synergies for the 
use of offshore financial centres to complement the structuring of global 
financial transactions. Wholesale finance at the international level is therefore 
very much a web of bilateral private obligations that was not subject to 
mandatory transparency. 
However, such opacity has allowed risky practices to be relatively 
undetected or losses to be hidden for purposes of reporting fraud, such as in the 
case of Enron before its downfall.  Post-crisis financial regulation reforms have 
now introduced a differentiation between onshore jurisdictions most affected 
by the crisis and their offshore counterparts. At the general level, financial 
transaction transparency105 has been greatly increased, and the regulation of 
financial institutions’ conduct and internal control106 have greatly ramped up. 
In this general context, the use of offshore vehicles may now become more 
awkward, costly or unattractive for regulatory compliance purposes. 
In the area of securitisation, offshore financial centres which offer tax 
advantages have been an indispensable part of securitisation transactions. In 
such transactions, financial institutions that originate the assets for 
securitisation, such as home mortgages, transfer the assets to an offshore 
special purpose vehicle in order to remove the assets from their lending books, 
and in order for such assets to be repackaged, tranched and then rated to be 
offered to investors.107 Offshore corporate vehicles are essential in 
securitisation as they are cost effective for loan originators/sponsors and offer 
tax advantages to investors. Further, such vehicles can be structured to be 
bankruptcy remote and not affected by the originator’s own credit ratings. As 
such, these vehicles can achieve high credit ratings and attract significant 
investor interest in the securitised assets. However, there are weaknesses in 
using offshore structures as the principal offeror of such assets- the quality of 
information transparency offered to investors may be superficial, and investors 
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may not have recourse against originators for defects in due diligence that 
affect the ultimate profitability in the underlying assets.  
Post crisis, securitisation has become a more costly process as originating 
institutions must retain risk of at least 5%,108 and improve due diligence and 
transparency of underlying assets. Otherwise, such assets could become very 
unattractive, as the holding of such assets attracts severe regulatory capital 
treatment- a high risk weighting of 1250% for the assets concerned and 
consequently high levels of regulatory capital against such holdings.109 Further, 
credit rating agencies have come under fire110 for readily giving top ratings to 
such structured products in the pre-crisis era, and are now subject to regulation 
in the EU that requires such assets to be rated with more care.111 As such, 
offshore jurisdictions need to reform their securities regulatory disclosure 
regimes and regulation of internal governance and control generally in 
financial regulation, so that securitised assets offered by offshore special 
purpose vehicles can remain well-rated, attractive to investors and compliant 
with regulatory requirements. These would likely impose more cost on such 
structured finance transactions. Price Waterhouse Coopers112 is of the view that 
these are challenges for the continued viability of the offshore securitisation 
industry, and it remains uncertain if this business model will continue to 
flourish or may become too costly in view of the new regulatory demands. 
Further, reforms in financial regulation have now tightened up the scope 
for mutual recognition of offshore financial structures for the purpose of 
marketing and distribution in the EU. Such mutual recognition is now based on 
more stringent criteria based on the quality of the micro-state’s tax and 
regulatory governance. For example, the EU Alternative Investment Fund 
Managers Directive 2011113 (that provides for a pan-European passport for 
onshore hedge and private equity fund managers provided they comply with 
the Directive) provide only for limited rights to market funds incorporated 
outside the EU. Such funds would have limited marketing prospects if they are 
not incorporated in a jurisdiction compliant with the Model OECD Tax 
convention.114 As many alternative funds are incorporated in micro-states in 
order to protect investor income from home country capital gains taxation, the 
EU Directive is arguably challenging that practice by making it more difficult 
for those funds to access the European investor markets. In fact, the European 
Securities Markets Authority has only granted European-wide marketing rights 
to hedge funds domiciled in Guernsey, Jersey and Switzerland, at the moment 
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leaving out the Cayman Islands, which is a large hedge fund domicile 
jurisdiction, the US, Hong Kong and Singapore.115  
The unilateral measures discussed in this Section are aimed at dis-
incentivising the use of offshore tax and financial centres by multinational 
corporations and international financial institutions. EU financial regulation 
and the UK’s Finance Act 2016 attempt to undermine the use of such offshore 
tax and financial centres. The US FATCA and European Savings Directive 
attack the bank secrecy regime that complements offshore tax and financial 
centre models. Would these unilateral measures so disarm any comparative 
advantage micro-states enjoy in regulatory competition that the death knell for 
such competition is sounded? The abovementioned measures could have the 
effect of permanently altering the international legal order if offshore tax and 
financial centres are eventually ‘driven out of business’. 
IV. FUTURE TRAJECTORY IN MICRO-STATES’ REFORMS AND CONCLUSION 
Commentators have wondered aloud how these new challenges may 
endanger micro-states’ sovereignty as well as economic survival.116 Further, it 
is observed that the unilateral measures discussed above are paving the way for 
international standards based on these unilateral measures. The OECD has in 
2014, in tandem with the coming into force of the US FATCA, issued a 
Standard for Automatic Information Reporting, as a measure of international 
convergence.117 Further, work is in progress under one of the action groups of 
the OECD to bring about convergence in mandatory tax reporting for 
businesses.118 
Micro-states have arguably reached a turning point for their economic 
models. Their reliance on tax arbitrage is arguably unsustainable in the long 
term, and in general, they need to move away from the model of simply 
capitalising on regulatory arbitrage or avoidance, as the unilateral measures 
discussed above signal a new resolve on the part of powerful onshore 
jurisdictions to close in on areas of arbitrage. It is not sustainable to construct 
an economic model that merely exploits existing arbitrage gaps for 
international businesses.  
Regulatory competition at the ‘low end’119 is unstable and unsustainable. 
The negative reputation associated with exploitative arbitrage tends to 
adversely affect the assets associated with the low end of regulatory arbitrage. 
These assets could then be subject to restrictions in non-haven jurisdictions and 
suffer from less global mobility. In an age of increased regulatory demands and 
higher standards, the use of offshore jurisdictions for low-end compliance will 
become counterproductive for international business and finance. Some micro-
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states have started winding down their tax and offshore financial centre 
models, for example, the Netherlands Antilles has marginalised its tax haven 
economic model to become more internationally convergent has therefore 
reduced the scope of its role in tax competition.120  
However, micro-states may adapt to their new challenges by reforming 
their economic models to engage in new forms of international regulatory 
competition.121  Based on a consultancy project the author has carried out for a 
micro-state jurisdiction, we have engaged with policy-makers and obtained 
early first-hand insights into what visions micro-states may develop for the 
future.122  
Micro-states have little choice but to engage with international regulatory 
competition. Many micro-states have small domestic economies, hence there is 
a limit to the extent they can develop their real economies in goods and 
services to compete in international trade. Their comparative advantage may lie 
in the provision of specialised services for international business and finance 
and in continuing to commercialise certain aspects of its regulatory sovereignty 
to cater for such needs.123 In other words, micro-states are unlikely able to 
move away from the mixture of regulatory competition and differentiation that 
has sustained their economic models, but the bases for such competition and 
differentiation may need to change.  
Many micro-states have become affluent124 over the last decades. 
Although this makes it difficult for policy makers to choose to move away 
from hitherto successful economic models, micro-states are also strongly 
incentivised to preserve their affluence. Further, with their experience in 
facilitating financial innovation and their well-established ties with the 
sophisticated financial sector, micro-states continue to be motivated to generate 
policy innovation in the same spirit. In this age of globalisation of business 
especially through the internet and rapid breakthroughs in digital technology, 
micro-states are exploring innovation and diversification that would allow 
them to remain competitive in new ways in the global economy. 
Micro-states need to cater for international business needs, but as 
international business is facing higher regulatory standards in many onshore 
jurisdictions, and investors are concerned that such standards be maintained, 
micro-states should develop incorporation jurisdictions that are modern, user-
friendly, supported by sound standards for governance, transparency and 
regulatory monitoring, and are attractive to international investors. Micro-states 
would also need to engage in administrative and bureaucratic innovation to 
make their incorporation and financial regulatory services viable yet cost-
effective. Further, micro-states should also look into niche markets that they 
can develop, in order to meaningfully differentiate themselves in the 
competition for international business and finance.  
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The future of regulatory competition based chiefly on tax arbitrage looks 
unsustainable, as post-crisis unilateral measures adopted by the US, EU and 
UK are likely to undermine micro-states’ tax and offshore financial centres in a 
manner more than ever imagined under previous multilateral arrangements. 
However, micro-states can take the opportunity to reframe the terms of 
regulatory competition, and play a part in shaping the international legal order 
even in such challenging times. 
 
